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Accidental Harm Under (Roman)
Civil Law
Corjo Jansen
Abstract A leading idea under Roman private law and nearly all European legal
systems is that an owner has to bear the risk of an accidental loss (casus). An
accident is a circumstance for which a third party cannot be blamed (culpa or fault).
A person suffering damage from an accident had to bear that damage himself. This
idea has been subject to attack throughout history. Every once in a while, it is said
that ‘bad luck must be righted’ (‘pech moet weg’). This position has not become the
prevailing viewpoint among lawyers. Although it does not seem very realistic, ‘bad
luck must be righted’ did form the basis of social security policies of the
Netherlands and some other western countries after World War II: social security
‘from womb to tomb’. The scope of social security beneﬁts has been reduced in
many countries in the last decades of the twentieth century, because the costs were
no longer affordable. The idea that a owner has to bear the risk of casus has
withstood the test of time quite well. That accidental harm must be borne by the one
suffering it, is legally and morally justiﬁable.
1 Introduction
While engaging in activities, a person may suffer damage himself or, even worse,
cause damage to someone else. An example for each situation is very easy to
provide for. The ﬁrst situation involves damage brought on by one’s self: An
individual slips and falls after a heavy rain shower and breaks a leg. The second
situation involves damage brought on by another person: A bicyclist knocks down a
pedestrian, who winds up with a broken arm. The moment at which the damage
arises is often the point in time when the law comes into the picture. A signiﬁcant
task of the law is to formulate rules to specify in which cases damage must be
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compensated, for a person’s freedom of action is not unlimited. The question arises
whether someone who has suffered damage has to bear the loss himself or whether
another person should bear liability for this.
A leading idea under the law is that the loss should lie where it falls.1 This notion
reflects the old adage under Roman law, ‘casum sentit dominus’. An owner has to
bear the risk of an accidental loss or an accidental deterioration which has resulted
in harm to him.2
This viewpoint has been criticised by, for example, the renowned German
professor of Roman law, B. Windscheid (1817–1892): “Unbrauchbar und in dieser
Allgemeinheit unrichtig (…).”3 Another prominent German scholar, H. Dernburg
(1829–1907), was equally disapproving of the casum sentit dominus rule, stating:
“Ihre Unhaltbarkeit wird (…) nicht leicht bestritten.”4 And yet, under nearly all
European legal systems, this rule appears to be authoritative. The legislator in
Austria even laid it down in that country’s civil code (§ 1311 ABGB of 1811): “Der
bloße Zufall trifft denjenigen, in dessen Vermögen oder Person er sich ereignet.”5
The Roman law adage ‘casum sentit dominus’ is still important to day. The civil
law systems of the Continent stem from Roman law. This law has become the
intellectual ground for a largely homogenous legal culture on the Continent, based
on the reception of Roman legal rules and principles. The two most important civil
codes influenced by Roman law are the Code civil (Cc) of France (1804) and the
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) of Germany (1900). Spain, Portugal, Belgium, the
Netherlands, the former colonies of France and nearly the whole of South America
have adopted the French Cc. Greece and Japan adopted the German BGB.
Contrariwise to the Continent, England developed an unique legal tradition. This
tradition is called Common Law. Nearly 40 % of all the people live in common law
countries, like the United States of America, Australia, New Zealand, India,
Pakistan and the other former colonies of England. Also the common law tradition
has accepted the idea that loss should lie where it falls. That’s why nearly all legal
systems in the world know the adage ‘casum sentit dominus’. In this article, the
focus is on the Roman law tradition.6
An issue which crops up under Roman law (and thus under Continental civil
law) is the meaning which needs to be given to the concept of ‘casus’ (‘accident’).
Roman-law sources suggest two meanings here. In the ﬁrst instance, these sources
teach, an ‘accident’ refers to some natural phenomenon (‘act of God’), such as a
1Hartlief (1997); Sieburgh (2000); Markesinis and Deakin (2003), p. 42.
2Code of Justinian (C.) 4,24,9; Digests (D.) 50,17,23 (casus a nullo praestantur). See Wacke
(1984), p. 271; Zimmermann (1996), pp. 154, 162, and 281; Sieburgh (2000), p. 5. Also referred to
as ‘res perit domino’.
3Windscheid and Kipp (1900), § 264, fn. 5: ‘Useless and in this indeﬁnite way wrong’.
4Dernburg (1903), p. 123, Note 3. For other examples, see Ranieri (2009), pp. 569–572.
5Wacke (1984), p. 670. Cf. Article 1105 Código Civil (Spanish Civil Code). In the Netherlands,
see the Flood Damage Act 1953, Article 8:543 Dutch Civil Code and Article 8:1004(2) Dutch
Civil Code.
6Zweigert and Kötz (1998), pp. 68–69, 218 et seq., 298; Zimmermann (2011), 27 et seq.
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lightning strike, flood, earthquake or compact impact.7 Further, an ‘accident’ may
involve some misfortune, an unfortunate confluence of circumstances or ‘allge-
meine Lebensrisiko’.
To ﬁgure out the place ‘casus’ occupies under (Roman) private law, let’s revisit
my two earlier examples. If a person slips and falls after a heavy rain shower and
breaks his leg, that person must bear the risk of his loss. The fact that the person
slipped and fell is a risk which everyone runs in daily life. Another party cannot be
made to pay for the damage. The situation might be different if an individual slips
on a banana peel which was deliberately put on the floor. There is a very good
chance in that case that someone else will be liable for the loss suffered. In the
example where a pedestrian breaks his arm because of the bicyclist’s actions, the
question likewise arises whether the person suffering damage can hold someone
else liable or not. The major reason for having another person foot the bill for the
injury in the last two examples is that the injury can be traced back to the fault
(culpa) of the persons causing the damage. The bicyclist bears blame for the
pedestrian’s broken arm, just as the person placing the banana peel on the floor can
be blamed for the broken leg (liability without fault is also possible under the law,
by the way, but I won’t get into that here). “Fault is the basic element of the law of
torts.”8 In these examples, ‘accident’ stands in contrast to fault (in the sense of
blameworthiness).9 Unlike with ‘fault’, the damage is not attributable to a person in
the case of an ‘accident’. By law, an accident is a circumstance for which a third
party cannot be blamed or which is not attributable to someone.
Are there other meanings given to ‘accident’ which are relevant in (Roman)
private law and which modify or expand the deﬁnition? In his inaugural lecture, De
Mul, professor of philosophy in Rotterdam, argued that, under private law, the term
‘accident’ mainly signiﬁes something being determined by fate and is often asso-
ciated with such concepts as ‘unforeseen’ or ‘unforeseeable’.10 I won’t get into the
ﬁrst part of De Mul’s deﬁnition. As to the second part, I note the following. For
lawyers, concepts like ‘unforeseen’ and ‘unforeseeable’ are primarily factors in
determining whether certain harm came about because of someone’s fault. There is
fault when what could have been foreseen by a diligent man was not foreseen. Fault
entails someone’s having acted differently than he should have, given the cir-
cumstances of the case.11 If that is so, he can be blamed for the harm. The meaning
7I won’t get into the tricky distinction between casus and vis major (force majeure or ‘scourge of
God’: D. 19,2,26,6). There is some overlap between the two terms. Coing (1989), p. 462, and
Deroussin (2007), pp. 592–593.
8Owen (1995), pp. 201, 208–209, 223 et seq.; Atiyah (1997), p. 3; Zimmermann (1996), p. 1034;
Markesinis and Deakin (2003), 41 et seq. Cf. D. 50,17,23.
9Bruins (1906), pp. 71–72; Rümelin (1896), p. 17; Von Bar (1999), Nos. 318-322, 485;
Sieburgh (2000), 14 et seq.
10De Mul (1994), pp. 8–12, mentions two other basic connotations of ‘accident’: fortuitous (in-
cidental or inessential) and contingent. See also Rümelin (1896), pp. 8–9 and 18.
11Cf. D. 9,2,31; Zimmermann (1996), pp. 1007–1009; Hartkamp and Sieburgh 6-IV* (2011),
No. 100.
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propounded by De Mul leaves the above deﬁnition of ‘accident’ intact. In
Rümelin’s words: “[Im Gegensatz zur Schuld spielt Zufall, das nicht
Vorhergesehene und erfahrungsgemäss nicht Vorhersehbare] die Rolle eines
Grenzbegriffs für irgend welche Verantwortlichkeit.”12 Moreover, unintended
consequences of people’s conduct are often referred to as ‘accidental’.13 They, too,
may be taken into account when assessing whether a certain action may be imputed
to someone or not. Again, modifying the deﬁnition of ‘accident’ (in contrast to
‘fault’) does not seem necessary.
A brief digression about the sources of the obligation helps us to analyse the
function of casus (accident) and culpa (fault) under (Roman) private law and the
legal consequences which ensue from this. With regard to each Roman-law or other
source, the notion of casus or culpa is, to a certain degree, developed differently.
2 Sources of Obligation Under Roman and Modern Law
An obligation to compensate another person’s damage is not obvious. In his
Institutes, the Roman lawyer Gaius (110–185 AD) distinguished two categories
from which such an obligation might arise. “Every obligation arises either from
contract or from wrongdoing.”14 The distinction between these two sources of
obligation has withstood the test of time. It can also be seen in modern legal
systems. Obligations to pay compensation do not, however, only arise from contract
or wrongdoing. Gaius recognised this as well. In the second book passed down in
his name, Res cottidianae sive aurea, Golden Words, Gaius added a third category
as a source of obligation: “Obligations arise either from contract or from wrong-
doing or, by some special right, from various types of causes.”15 What were
examples of such another cause? Gaius talked about several of these in the third
book of his Golden Words. One example was managing someone else’s interest,
negotiorum gestio (‘agency without a mandate’). If someone looked after an absent
person’s affairs without having been instructed to do so, the two individuals became
connected to each other and could litigate against one another based on the notion of
management of another’s affairs without authorisation. These legal actions did not
arise from contract or wrongdoing. After all, the party managing the absent party’s
affairs had not concluded a contract with the absent party beforehand. Managing a
person’s affairs without a mandate was not a form of wrongdoing, either.16
12Rümelin (1896), p. 53.
13Rümelin (1896), p. 18; De Mul (1994), p. 12.
14Institutes of Gaius (Gai. Inst.) 3,88: (…): omnis enim obligatio vel ex contractu nascitur vel ex
delicto.
15D. 44,7,1,pr.: Obligationes aut ex contractu nascuntur aut ex maleﬁcio aut proprio quodam iure
ex variis causarum ﬁguris.
16D. 44,7,5,pr.
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The emperor Justinian (527–565) adopted the distinction from the Golden Words
in his Institutes and changed it a little: “A further sub-classiﬁcation results in four
categories: speciﬁcally, obligations arising from contract, as if they were a contract
(quasi-contract), or from delict, as if they were a delict (quasi-delict).”17 Many
European legislators built upon Justinian’s views in their legal codes. This also held
true for the Dutch Civil Code of 1838. Under Article 1269 of this Code, all
obligations resulted from either contract or the law [de wet]. Pursuant to
Article 1388 Dutch Civil Code 1838, the latter category could in turn be
sub-divided into obligations emanating “from the law alone or from the law as a
result of human conduct”. Obligations ensuing from the law due to people’s con-
duct arose from “a lawful or an unlawful act” (Article 1389 Dutch Civil Code
1838). The provisions in Article 1269 Dutch Civil Code 1838 were criticised in the
literature. In laying the foundations for the current Dutch Civil Code (1992),
E.M. Meijers (1880–1954), professor of civil law in Leyde, tried to restore Gaius’s
deﬁnition. Meijers’s original wording of Article 6:1 Dutch Civil Code stated that
obligations arose from contract, tort or other juridical facts if these ensued from the
law. He wanted to prevent obligations from rising outside the law based on the
principle of reasonableness and fairness (‘good faith’) or based on unwritten law or
custom. That simply produced legal uncertainty and legal inequality.18 Legislators
after him looked to the Dutch Supreme Court’s decision in Quint v Te Poel19 to
formulate the sources of obligation under the new Dutch Civil Code. According to
Article 6:1 Dutch Civil Code, obligations can only arise from the law. The words
‘from the law’, the Dutch Supreme Court explained, do not in any way mean that
each obligation has to be expressly provided for by the law. In situations not
provided for by law, the solution must be accepted “which ﬁts into the statutory
legal system and is in line with rules already laid down for similar situations.” Still,
Justinian’s ancient Roman classiﬁcation system lies behind the sparse wording of
Article 6:1 Dutch Civil Code.
I will successively discuss the role of casus under Roman tort law, Roman
contract law and Roman law concerning negotiorum gestio.20
17Institutes of Justinian (Inst.) 3,13,2: Sequens divisio in quattuor species diducitur: aut enim ex
contractu sunt aut quasi ex contractu aut ex maleﬁcio aut quasi ex maleﬁcio. See also Inst. 4,5,pr.
18Asser, Hartkamp and Sieburgh 6-I* (2008), No. 47 et seq.
19Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad), 30 January 1959, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (NJ) 1959,
548.
20Casus does not come into play with quasi-delicts.
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3 Accidental Harm Under Roman Tort Law
and Subsequent Criticism
The sources are very clear about the fact that, under Roman tort law, a person
suffering damage from an accident had to bear that damage himself. Gaius con-
tended that a party causing damage without fault or not intentionally, but instead by
accident (casu), should remain ‘unpunished’.21 The lawyer Alfenus (who lived in
the ﬁrst century before Christ) responded similarly when asked whether the owner
of a slave who had broken his leg during a game after being pushed hard could
litigate pursuant to the lex Aquilia, a statute reforming the law on wrongful damage
to property by the Roman assembly of the plebs (the comitia centuriata) from 286
or 287 BC, named after the person who proposed it, the tribune Aquilius. Litigation
was not possible, “[because] the unfortunate event needed to be deemed the result
of an accident (casu) rather than fault.”22 This position has been subject to attack
throughout history. The natural law scholar Chr. Thomasius (1655–1728) regarded
‘you must not injure your neighbour’ (alterum non laedere), a perspective which
could also be found in the sources,23 as the guiding principle of tort law, from
which he concluded that every damage ought to be compensated, even if it was
caused by accident. “It is not only equitable but even just that I should make good
damage done by accident.” If, for instance, a person accidentally dropped some-
one’s crystal glass, that person was, Thomasius felt, liable for the damage. It was
his curiosity, not the owner’s curiosity, which made the glass fall.24 Thomasius’s
position did not reflect the view of Roman lawyers. It has also not been embraced
very much by today’s lawyers. Every once in a while, it is said that ‘bad luck must
be righted’ [pech moet weg], even if one can only blame one’s self for it, but this is
not the prevailing attitude. Lord Steyn, a justice of the current Supreme Court of the
United Kingdom, articulated this feeling well:
“But we do not live in Utopia: we live in a practical world where the tort system imposes
limits to the classes of claims that rank for consideration as well as to the heads of
recoverable damages. This results, of course, in imperfect justice but it is by and large the
best that the common law can do.”25
21Gai. Inst. 3,211: Itaque inpunitus est qui sine culpa et dolo malo, casu quodam damnum
committit.
22D. 9,2,52,4: Respondi non posse, cum casu magis quam culpa videretur factum.
23D. 1,1,10,1.
24Thomasius (2000), Sec. IV; Jansen (2009), 231 et seq.; Atiyah (1997), pp. 178–179. To his
mind, the assumption that every type of loss ought to be compensated makes the compensatory
system unaffordable.
25[1998] 3 WLR 1539B-C (per Lord Steyn).
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4 Accidental Harm Under Roman Contract Law
A contract usually involves two people: a debtor and a creditor. They must act with
due care towards each other. The degree of care they need to exercise depends on
the type of contract and the object to which the contract pertains (a horse, for
instance, requires different care than a slave or painting). If debtors or creditors
breach their duties of care, they will be liable for the ensuing damage. Here’s an
example. A person lends his bicycle to his neighbour (‘the contract of commoda-
tum’). The bicycle is stolen from the neighbour. Is the neighbour liable for this
theft? This question cannot easily be answered. The crux of the issue is the scope of
the neighbour’s duty of care. Generally speaking, if a person does not exercise the
requisite duty of care, he is at fault and is liable. Commodatum consisted of a
gratuitous loan of a corporeal thing (mostly movables). The party borrowing the
bicycle does not owe any money to the other party. Furthermore, lending out the
bicycle is in the borrower’s interest. Hence, Roman lawyers believed that the party
who borrowed the bicycle, the neighbour in my example, had a very weighty duty
of care (‘custodia’, or a duty of safekeeping). Because of this duty, the neighbour
was liable to the lender of the bicycle in the event of theft. The borrower, who was
responsible for custodia, had to therefore compensate the lender’s damage, even
though, subjectively, the borrower bore no blame.
This basic principle regarding commodatum did not automatically apply to other
contracts. Some agreements merely entailed liability for intentional misconduct
(dolus), others, for intentional misconduct (dolus) and fault (culpa), and still others,
for intentional misconduct (dolus), fault (culpa) and custodia. The contract of
mutuum received special treatment. Such a contract consisted of transferring
ownership of a quantity of fungible goods (such as money or grain) to another
party, who undertook to return an equal quantity of goods of the same sort. The
most prominent example of a mutuum was the moneylending contract. The bor-
rower became the owner of the goods. Consequently, the borrower bore the risk of
destruction of the objects, even if this occurred by accident (casu fortuito), due to,
say, ﬁre, collapse, shipwreck or an attack by bandits or enemies.26 This principle
was consistent with the rule that owners bear the risk of an accidental loss.
With other contracts, the required level of due care varied, but was never
absolute. To quote the applicable Roman legislative text verbatim, “no one need
bear responsibility for accidents and deaths occurring to living beings which are not
attributable to anyone’s fault, escapes by slaves usually left unguarded, or rob-
beries, riots, ﬁres, floods or attacks by bandits.”27 Such occurrences corresponded
in large measure to ‘acts of God’ under English law. A borrower had to act with the
utmost due care, for example. As we have seen, this meant, too, that the borrower
was liable to the lender for theft. The borrower only avoided liability for events
26Inst. 3,14,2 and D. 44,7,1,4. See Wallinga (2009), p. 225 et seq.
27D. 50,17,23: (….) casus mortesque, quae sine culpa accidunt, (…) a nullo praestantur.
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which nobody could defend against (casus non praestat), such as attacks by ban-
dits, enemies or pirates, ﬁre and so on.28 As Schulz put it:
“[A borrower] was absolutely liable for certain typical accidents which were regarded as
avoidable by properly watching and guarding the borrowed thing, and on the other hand he
was not liable for other typical accidents which were invariably regarded as not avoidable
by the exercise of care.”29
A depositee who had offered to take possession of someone else’s property was
liable for intentional misconduct, negligence and custodia, but not for fortuitous
events (casus fortuitos).30 A man who could show that he had lost his bookkeeping
records on account of a shipwreck, collapse, ﬁre or similar accident (alio simili
casu) was not accountable to the banker from whom he had borrowed money.31
Likewise, losses incurred by accident (casu) were not chargeable to the balances
which slaves had to pay their masters.32 In contrast, a mandatary could not seek
reimbursement of his costs from the mandator if the mandatary had been robbed by
bandits or had lost property during a shipwreck. These events were attributable to
accident (magis casibusquam) rather than the mandate.33 If casus was involved, the
party who had suffered damage thus bore this damage himself. There was no reason
to shift the risk onto somebody else’s shoulders.
5 Accidental Harm in the Case of Negotiorum Gestio
The idea of the management of another’s affairs is a peculiarity under the law, since
furnishing unsolicited help to another person is a precarious undertaking. Such
conduct is readily seen as an undesirable interference or as a curtailment of
someone’s freedom. Under Roman law, no one was obliged to help another person.
Nevertheless, there was a strong notion that citizens should help their fellow citi-
zens in times of distress, by, for example, giving advice, providing a loan or
voluntarily managing someone’s interests without a mandate to do so. Schulz
described ‘management of another’s affairs’ as a “quite original genuinely Roman
creation without parallels in the laws of other peoples not dependant on Roman
Law.”34
28D. 13,6,18 pr. and D. 44,7,1,4.
29Schulz 1969, p. 515.
30D. 16,3,1,35. Zimmermann (1996), pp. 208–209. Such wide-ranging liability for a custodian is
rather exceptional. It can be seen, too, in French law, but not in German law. Normally, a
custodian is liable for dolus.
31D. 2,13,6,9.
32D. 40,5,41,7.
33D. 17,1,26,6; Zimmermann (1996), pp. 430–431.
34Schulz (1969), p. 624; Kortmann (2005), p. 99 et seq.; Jansen (2014), p. 43 et seq.
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The special nature of negotiorum gestio was also apparent in the manager’s
scope of liability; if an individual took care of the interests of an absent person who
was unaware of this, the manager became liable for both wilful misconduct and
negligence. A leading Roman lawyer maintained, however, that the party looking
after the affairs even “had to answer for accident (casus), for example if in the name
of the absent principal he transacts business the principal did not usually do.” It
goes without saying that such liability would be very extensive. Presumably, this
far-reaching liability was prompted by the deep-seated aversion to representing
someone’s interests against the will of that person.35
6 Other Meanings of ‘Casus’ in the Roman Sources
‘Casus’ does not just mean ‘accident’ in the Roman-law sources. Sometimes, the
word signiﬁes ‘misfortune’, ‘fate’, ‘adversity’ or ‘setback’. In these instances, it
refers—just like in the case of accident—to an event resulting in damage which
cannot be traced back to another party’s fault. One text, for instance, categorises
trees being uprooted or trees being blown over because of a storm as ‘casus’.36 A
Roman lawyer used the word ‘casus’ in a similar sense, when he noted that it is
neither decent nor natural to speculate about the misfortune or setback which a free
man has suffered.37
‘Casus’ sometimes relates to destiny, say, to the fact that a person is deaf or
blind.38 These meanings of ‘accident’ suggest something of the incomprehensibility
or arbitrariness of life and the vicissitudes of fate (see De Mul’s deﬁnition given in
this article’s introduction). ‘Accident’ here pertains not to human conduct, but to
divine or similar intervention. It sets forth the limit of what lies within a person’s
control.39
Finally, the Roman-law sources seem to imply that ‘casus’ also means ‘inde-
pendent of a person’s will’. The law made it possible for giving rise of a legal
consequence to hinge on a condition. Someone decided that the legal consequences
would only arise if or until an uncertain future event took place (such as ownership
not being transferred until the entire purchase price was paid). A slave, for example,
35D. 3,5,10; Zimmermann (1996), pp. 446–447. See also § 678 BGB (German Civil Code), which
adopted this solution. The Dutch Supreme Court has embraced this position as well: Supreme
Court, 19 April 1996, NJ 1997, 24.
36D. 7,1,12,pr.
37D. 45,1,83,5. See also D. 4,6,1,pr.
38D. 3,1,1,3 and 5. See also D. 4,4,11,5.
39Eijsbouts (1989), pp. 2, 16, 19–20. See also the deﬁnition of ‘treasure’ in Article 642(2) Dutch
Civil Code 1838 (Article 716 Code Civil (French Civil Code): a ‘treasure’ had to have been
discovered by pure chance (le pur effet du hasard) (Eijsbouts (1989), pp. 6–7). In the current
Article 5:13 Dutch Civil Code (a translation of § 984 BGB), chance is no longer an element of the
deﬁnition of treasure.
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might have been set free under a certain condition. This might have consisted of a
fact, an action or one or another fortuitous circumstance (casu).40
7 Brief Interlude: ‘Casus’ Under Roman Criminal Law
Unlike in modern criminal law, ‘casus’ (by accident) is mentioned in the text of
several Roman-law criminal provisions. The term had to do with the state of mind
with which a crime was committed: with premeditation (proposito); in the heat of
the moment (impetu) or by accident (casu, when, for example, a spear thrown at a
wild animal during a hunt killed a man).41 The state of mind was relevant in
determining the severity of the punishment. In the case of the more serious crimes,
ascertaining whether these had been committed with premeditation or by accident
(casus) was crucial, said the lawyer Ulpianus (who died in 223). For all crimes, this
distinction had to result in either a just punishment or reduced punishment.42
Hence, according to the emperor Hadrian (117–138), the punishment for an indi-
vidual who had committed manslaughter accidentally (casu) rather than inten-
tionally (magis quam voluntate) during a scuffle was moderated.43 In modern
criminal-law systems, intent, premeditation and negligence are the subjective ele-
ments of a crime. These days, casus is a factor in determining the degree of guilt
which can be ascribed to accused individuals when they have engaged in potentially
criminal conduct.
Accident always plays a role in criminal law to some extent. Whether certain
punishable conduct must be characterised as an assault or as manslaughter depends
on the consequence which ensues. Often, whether someone dies or is merely
seriously injured as a result of a sharp blow to the face is a matter of accident.
Potentially punishable conduct may likewise be nipped in the bud purely by
accident; consider, for example, the case of a heavy rain shower which extinguishes
a deliberately set ﬁre.44
40D. 40,5,33,1.
41D. 48,19,11,2.
42D. 48,19,5,2. See also D. 47,9,9.
43D. 48,8,1,3.
44Whether such an arson attempt constitutes a crime will depend on the circumstances of the case.
See Dutch Supreme Court, 19 March 1934, NJ 1934, p. 350 (the Eindhoven arson judgment) and
Dutch Supreme Court, 19 September 1977, NJ 1978, 126.
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8 Accidental Harm Under Modern Private Law
The viewpoints found in Roman law have—as stated above—often remained
valuable for modern civil law. To the extent they still apply, the scope of their
application must be determined. As we have seen, in Roman law, casus (in the
sense of ‘accident’) played a role in contract law, the management of another’s
affairs and tort law. The force majeure doctrine (‘non-attributable
non-performance’) has greatly diminished the role of accident in the area of con-
tract law. Briefly stated, a situation of force majeure exists if the debtor, for reasons
beyond his control, cannot fulﬁl his obligations. The failure of performance does
not result from his fault and is not at his risk. Notwithstanding this development in
modern private law, especially in the Dutch and German civil law, the ABGB
(Austrian Civil Code) and Código Civil (the Spanish Civil Code, 1889) still include
—consistent with the Roman-law tradition—casus (accident) in addition to force
majeure as a circumstance which frees debtors from their obligations (§1447 ABGB
and Article 1105 Código Civil respectively). French courts still take accidental
elements (l’aléa) into account as well.45
Almost all Continental legal systems look to the fault principle when a contract
is not performed or not in a timely or proper manner: If a debtor cannot be blamed
for the failure to perform, the debtor is not liable for damages. This principle was
expanded in the Dutch Civil Code of 1992. Debtors can claim force majeure if
performance is hindered for reasons for which they do not bear any fault and for
which they do not bear the risk.46 The standard concerning the debtor’s conduct is
objective insofar as the debtor must have acted as a prudent debtor would have
acted in the given situation (cf. Article 6:27 Dutch Civil Code and § 276 BGB). If
the debtor has violated this objective standard, it must be examined whether the
debtor can personally be blamed for this. If such personal blameworthiness (fault) is
lacking, the question becomes whether the debtor is liable based on the law,
juridical act or ‘generally accepted principles’/common opinion (see Article 6:75
Dutch Civil Code).47 A person may invoke force majeure, for instance, if his life or
liberty is threatened. Under generally accepted standards, the person is not liable
then. For a comprehensive comparative–law analysis of fault and wilful or inten-
tional misconduct in determining whether a debtor has breached his obligations
towards the other party, I refer to Ranieri.48
Casus seems to play a larger role in modern tort law than in modern contract
law. That is certainly true for the Netherlands. Whether a court must assume lia-
bility based on tort in a speciﬁc case will involve a weighing of the two viewpoints
mentioned earlier which dominate this area of the law: ‘the loss should lie where it
45Ranieri (2009), pp. 579–580, 584; Deroussin (2007), p. 594.
46Parlementaire Geschiedenis Boek 6 (1981), pp. 263–264; Hartkamp and Sieburgh 6-I* (2008),
No. 343; Ranieri (2009), p. 572.
47Hartkamp and Sieburgh 6-I* (2008), No. 344.
48Ranieri (2009), pp. 572–650.
Accidental Harm Under (Roman) Civil Law 243
falls’ and ‘you must not harm your neighbour’. The general consensus in
Continental legal systems is that the maxim ‘the loss should lie where it falls’ must
prevail if the damage arose through an accident, such as a failed harvest, flood or
lightning strike. Even if the actions by a person resulting in damage actually come
down to nothing more than an unfortunate confluence of circumstances, the party
suffering that damage must bear that damage himself.
I mention a few examples. An old woman who wanted to get into a bus stepped back to
allow someone to go in front of her. In stepping back, she bumped up against another old
woman, who fell and broke her hip. A hiker in a forest kicked a branch. This branch lashed
the eye of the hiker behind him. The hiker who got hit with the branch lost an eye. Two
sisters were moving house. One of them lost her grip on a cabinet while going down the
staircase. As a result, one sister’s arm became wedged between the cabinet and the wall.
The arm had to be amputated.49
In each of these situations, the conduct leading to harm cannot be said to have been
improper or unlawful. What’s more, the people in question can hardly be blamed
for their conduct. The injury was related to an everyday risk, to the fact that we live
and participate in society. These incidents are sometimes termed ‘common or
garden accidents’. The ensuing damage ought to remain where it fell. The risk did
not exceed the general risk of damage which an individual runs in daily life.
Further, the nature of the activity was not so dangerous that precautionary measures
needed to be taken.50 Of course, the situation changes if a person’s traits and
abilities should have kept that person from participating in certain activities. “Just
as it is ethically acceptable for people to claim personal credit for conduct which is
partly a product of their good luck in having a certain personality and certain
capacities, so people must accept responsibility for conduct which is partly a
product of bad luck in having a certain personality and certain capacities.”51
9 Concluding Observations
Law and casus go back a long way. Accident was and is mainly important in
answering the question whether certain damage must be borne by the party suf-
fering the damage (the ‘owner’) or whether another party can be made to pay for
this. This other party may be a natural person (the one causing the damage) or a
legal entity (in particular, an insurance company). All of the Continental legal
systems assume that damage arising by accident remains the responsibility of the
party suffering the damage. For liability for the damage to be passed on to another
49Dutch Supreme Court, 11 December 1987, NJ 1988, 393; Dutch Supreme Court, 9 December
1994, NJ 1996, 403; and Dutch Supreme Court, 12 May 2000, NJ 2001, 300.
50Von Bar (1999), Nos. 319–320; Sieburgh (2000), 12 et seq.; Hartkamp and Sieburgh 6-IV*
(2011), No. 20. Contrary view: Van Dam (2000), No. 808. See also Rümelin (1896), p. 12 et seq.
51Cane (1997), p. 51.
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party, the rule is and was that the damage must have been the fault of or attributable
to that other party. The Roman-law adage ‘casus sentit dominus’ has withstood the
test of time quite well. That accidental harm must be borne by the one suffering it is
also morally justiﬁable. Owen expressed this as follows: “To the extent that risks of
harm from action may be deemed a necessary part of ‘proper’ choices of action in
an uncertain world, and hence ‘reasonable’ according to some fair standard, they
should be viewed as ‘background risks’ of life for victims to protect against and
bear.”52
Obviously, accident could be excluded as much as possible under private law.
‘Bad luck must be righted’ [pech moet weg] could be taken as the point of
departure. Although this starting principle does not seem very realistic, it did form
the basis of Dutch social security policy after World War II. The starving, humil-
iated and exhausted Dutch population expected a future in which socio–economic
security was guaranteed for everyone and was no longer left to chance. This dream
had to be realised by seeking high employment and an extensive system of social
security and social welfare beneﬁts. The Van Rhijn Commission (established on
7 April 1943)53 was the auctor intellectualis of this philosophy in the Netherlands.
It articulated the following legal basis for a complete system of social security
beneﬁts encompassing the entire population:
“The community, organised in the form of the State, is responsible for the social security
and protection against want of all of its members, provided that those members themselves
do what is reasonable to furnish such social security and protection against want.”54
The Van Rhijn Commission gained inspiration from overseas. Reports and plans in
the United States and Great Britain served as models for the Dutch proposals.
Winston Churchill (1874–1965) was instrumental here. Together with the American
president Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882–1945), he was the originator of the
Atlantic Charter of 19 August 1941. That charter set out all sorts of freedoms,
including ‘freedom from want’. Such protection against want was intended to
accomplish the following: “to bring about the fullest collaboration between all
nations in the economic ﬁeld, with the object of securing for all improved labour
standards, economic advancement, and social security.” The ideal here reflected the
famous principle derived from Churchill, namely, ‘social security from womb to
tomb’.55 This welfare state ideal was taken too far by some, who subscribed to the
‘bad-luck-must-be-righted’ notion and who wanted to shift any damage which a
citizen might suffer primarily to the State (through social security, state funds, state
52Owen (1995), pp. 226–227.
53A.A. van Rhijn (1892–1986) was a secretary-general in several government departments (1933–
1940), Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries (1940–1941) and Secretary-General at Social Affairs
(1945–1950). His commission was responsible for providing a preliminary overview regarding the
principles and main features of social security in the Netherlands.
54Social Security Report (1945) II, p. 10.
55Jansen and Loonstra (2013), pp. 269–270. A variation on this saying is ‘from the cradle to the
grave’.
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pensions and the like). This goal entails many risks, as “[p]eople who have grown
up believing that the state would look always after them, no matter what misfor-
tunes should strike, are now driven to ﬁnd someone to sue, when they discover that
the state will not and cannot deliver on this expectation.”56
The scope of social security beneﬁts has been reduced recently in countries such
as the Netherlands. The costs were no longer affordable. The ‘damage’ was shifted
too much to the community, so that the pressure on private insurance and tort law
grew.57 Atiyah therefore argued that a no-fault system of liability should be
developed for accidents and the personal harm ensuing from these and that a system
of private and group insurance ought to be implemented for other cases of personal
harm.58 In principle, insurance, which provides the right to a beneﬁt if a particular
contingent event occurs, is not concerned about the cause of the event. Whether the
party entitled to the beneﬁt was at fault is irrelevant.59 Atiyah’s proposal, however,
has hardly generated any response. The part of casus under modern private law has
been anything but played out. The idea that the owner has to bear the consequences
of ‘accidents’ is still very much alive in all Continental legal systems.
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